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In this paper we investigate the role of ￿nancial development, or more wide-
spread access to ￿nance, in generating economic growth in four Latin American
countries between 1980 and 2007. The results, based on the relatively novel
panel time-series analysis, con￿rm the Schumpeterian prediction which suggests
that ￿nance authorises the entrepreneur to invest in productive activities, and
therefore to promote economic growth. Furthermore, given the characteristics
of the sample of countries chosen, we also highlight the importance of macro-
economic stability, and all the institutional framework that it encompasses, as
a necessary condition for ￿nancial development, and consequently for growth
and prosperity in the region.
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manoel.bittencourt@up.ac.za.Introduction and Motivation
Latin America has been know for a particular tendency of displaying erratic
growth rates, combined with political instability and poor macroeconomic perfor-
mance (in the role of high in￿ ation rates), in particular in the 1980s and ￿rst half
of the 1990s. Some of the countries presenting these characteristics in the region
include; Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru. Re-democratisation came in the 1980s
and macroeconomic stabilisation in the 1990s, and coincidentally enough, growth rates
and ￿nancial development became consistently positive some time after political and
economic stabilisation took root in the region.
Given this background, we investigate the role of ￿nancial development, or wider
access to resources which can be channelled to productive activities, in generating
growth and prosperity in four Latin American countries which displayed not only
political instability, but also hyperin￿ ationary episodes in the 1980s and early 1990s.
More speci￿cally, we use data from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru from 1980 to
2007, and the relatively novel panel time-series analysis to study the role, if any at
all, of ￿nancial development in promoting economic growth in the region.
The results suggest, once we account for all sorts of endogeneity problems, that
￿nancial development indeed played an important role in generating growth in the re-
gion, even under severe macroeconomic conditions. However, the results also indicate
that the e⁄ect of ￿nance on growth would be even greater if those countries had not
experienced the hyperin￿ ationary episodes of the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, we not
only con￿rm the early empirical evidence based on international cross-sectional and
panel analysis, but also highlight the role of macroeconomic instability in actually re-
ducing the size of the positive e⁄ect of ￿nance on growth, and consequently the welfare
1costs of poor macroeconomic performance on an important growth determinant1.
The subject of ￿nancial development and economic growth was ￿rst raised by
Schumpeter (1912), in which he highlights how important ￿nance is for the growth
and development of a capitalist economy. The Schumpeterian analysis is based on
the idea that credit, when in the hands of the ￿ entrepreneur￿ , is conducive to growth
and prosperity. Loosely speaking, with credit, the entrepreneur can alter the normal
￿ ow of an economy through innovations that, in turn, generate growth2.
Following that expert lead, King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998),
Beck, Levine and Loyaza (2000), and Beck and Levine (2004), using di⁄erent samples
of countries covering the period between 1960 and 1998, and methodologies based
on cross-sectional and panel analysis, report that a range of measures of ￿nancial
development have a positive e⁄ect on long-run growth. In addition, Rousseau and
Wachtel (2000), using annual international data from 1980 and 1995, and panel-var
analysis, are also able to report that ￿nance plays an important role in generating
economic growth3.
Given the above, the contribution of this paper to the literature is that, ￿rstly,
we follow the advice given by Fischer (1993) and conduct a case study on the subject
(i.e., we focus on understanding how those Latin American economies, which shared
some common features in the 1980s and 1990s, but that also present particular idio-
syncrasies of their own, behaved during an important period of their recent history,
so that a more disaggregated and informative analysis is conducted). Secondly, we
1For instance, Beck, Demirg￿c ￿-Kunt and Levine (2007), and Bittencourt (2010) suggest that ￿-
nancial development also plays an important role in reducing poverty and inequality, which reinforces
the prospective role of ￿nance on welfare.
2Schumpeter (1912) writes "credit is essentially the creation of purchasing power for the purpose
of transferring it to the entrepreneur, but not simply the transfer of existing purchasing power. The
creation of purchasing power characterises, in principle, the method by which development is carried
out in a system with private property and division of labor".
3For a thorough survey of the literature of ￿nance and growth, see Levine (2005).
2make use of principal component analysis in an attempt to reduce omitted variable
bias and model uncertainty in growth analysis.
Thirdly, we also follow the advice by Bruno and Easterly (1998)￿ and the analy-
sis by Rousseau and Wachtel (2000)￿ and make use of high-frequency annual data,
so that by avoiding the averages we can better pinpoint the e⁄ects of ￿nancial devel-
opment on economic growth during periods of macroeconomic instability. Finally, we
take advantage of the novel panel time-series analysis, which allows us to deal with
particular economic and statistical issues, so that we are able to provide new, reliable
and informative estimates on the subject.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: the next section describes the data
set and the empirical strategy utilised, and then reports and discusses the estimates
obtained. The following section concludes the paper, it puts the results into context,
and then it suggests some policy implications and also future related work.
Data, Empirical Strategy, and Results
Given data availability, the data set we use covers the period between 1980 and
2007, and four Latin American countries; namely Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru
(i.e., T=28 and N=4).
The growth rates of the real GDPs per capita (GROW) are provided by the Penn
World Table (PWT) data set mark 6.3. The measures of ￿nancial development used
are the ratio of the liquid liabilities to GDP (M2), which is a measure of ￿nancial
sector size, private bank credit over bank deposits, deposit money bank claims over
deposit money bank and central bank claims, both measuring ￿nancial intermediaries
activity in actually channeling resources from savers to borrowers, and stock market
capitalisation over GDP, which is a measure of stock market development, all from
3the Database on Financial Development and Structure provided by the World Bank4.
Using the information above, we make use of principal component analysis to
extract the unobserved common factors of these four di⁄erent measures of ￿nancial
development to construct FINDEV, so that we end up with a proxy for ￿nancial
development which contributes not only to reduce omitted variable bias and model
uncertainty, but also that presents more explanatory power. This is important be-
cause, with FINDEV, we are able to reduce the dimensionality of a set of prospective
￿nancial development explanatory variables that, in fact, contains most of the infor-
mation provided by the aforementioned ￿nancial variables5.
The control variables include the government￿ s share in the real GDP (GOV),
which proxies for the size of government, the ratio of exports and imports to real
GDP (OPEN), a proxy for economic openness, and the ratio of investment to real
GDP (INV), as one of the main canonical determinants of growth, all from the PWT
￿les. Moreover, we interact average years of schooling of those aged 25 and over (from
the Barro and Lee data set) with urbanisation rates (from the World Development
Indicators ￿les) to construct an index for development (DEV), which is supposed to
capture the fact that fast-growing societies tend to be not only more educated, but
also more urbanised (see Kuznets (1955)).
Furthermore, by using principal component analysis we are able to extract the
unobserved common factors of three normalised Polity IV variables (i.e., democracy,
constraints on the executive, and political competition), to construct a proxy for po-
litical regime characteristics (POL), which not only reduces model uncertainty, but
also takes into account that all four countries in the sample went through political
transitions in the 1980s. Finally, the data on in￿ ation (INFL) come from the Bu-
4For more on measures of ￿nancial development in general, see Demirg￿c ￿-Kunt and Levine (2001).
5See Huang (2005) for more on principal component analysis applied to ￿nancial development
measures.
4reaux of Census of the four countries, which captures the fact that all these countries
experienced poor macroeconomic performance (at least in terms of in￿ ation rates),
in the 1980s and ￿rst half of the 1990s.
For the sake of clarity, in Figure One below we plot the data on GDP per capita
and the baseline M2 in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru respectively. What we
can see from this preliminary eyeball evidence is that in all four countries, GDP per
capita and M2 seem to be moving in the same direction, which indicates that they
are somehow positively related to each other.
Moreover, the vertical lines in each panel indicate the hyperin￿ ationary episodes
that all four countries experienced either in the 1980s or 1990s, and it can also be
seen that GDP per capita and M2 su⁄ered severe contractions either before or im-
mediately after those episodes. Furthermore, we are also able to visualise that after
the macroeconomic stabilisations of the 1990s, both variables have been displaying a
consistent positive trend, which initially indicates that macroeconomic stability is, to
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Figure 1: GDP per capita and Financial Development, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru, 1980-
2007. Sources: Penn World Table and Database on Financial Development and Structure ￿les.
In addition, in Table One we present the correlation matrix of the variables used,
and both measures of ￿nancial development, M2 and FINDEV, present positive cor-
relations with economic growth in the sample. This is a step further from Figure One
above, and it suggests a positive statistical relationship between ￿nancial development
and growth during the period investigated.
The control variables present the expected statistical signs against growth (i.e.,
DEV, INV and OPEN present positive correlations with growth, suggesting that
more educated and urbanised societies, as well as higher investment and more eco-
nomically open societies tend to grow faster). The proxy for government size, GOV,
suggests that the stylised fact that bigger governments tend to be detrimental to
growth is valid in the region. Finally, POL indicates that more politically polarised
societies, or less democratic ones, tend to grow slower.
6Table 1: The Correlation Matrix: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru, 1980-2007.
GROW M2 FINDEV DEV INV OPEN GOV POL
GROW 1
M2 .209* 1
FINDEV .196 .593* 1
DEV .188* -.069 .030 1
INV .216* -.152 .072 .477* 1
OPEN .191* .382* .365* .093 -.277* 1
GOV -.305* -.160 -.439* -.270* -.157 -.609* 1
POL -.148 -.254* -.061 -.086 .361* -.347* .211* 1
Sources: Penn World Table, Database on Financial Development and Structure, World De-
velopment Indicators, Barro and Lee, and Polity IV ￿les. * represents signi￿cance at the 5% level.
Furthermore, in Figure Two we plot the OLS regression lines between M2 and
growth in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru. What can be seen is that in all four
panels there is a positive and statistically signi￿cant relationship between ￿nancial
development and economic growth, which indicates that there is an economic re-
lationship between these two variables (i.e., that more access to ￿nancial resources
somehow contributes to generate economic activity and consequently faster growth
in the region).
All the same, this initial inspection of the data, with all its caveats, suggests
that ￿nance presented a positive relationship with growth in the region during the
period investigated (i.e., the data plots suggest that M2 and growth moved in the
same direction over time, the statistical correlations amongst both measures of ￿nance
and growth are positive, and the OLS regression lines indicate a signi￿cant positive
7economic relationship between ￿nance and economic growth).
This is important not only because we are able to capture particular positive
comovements between ￿nance and growth, but also because all four countries in the
sample presented hyperin￿ ationary bursts and severe macroeconomic instability for
a considerable period of time in the 1980s and early 1990s. Nevertheless, ￿nance
has been positively related to economic growth even under severe macroeconomic
mismanagement, which further highlights the potential of ￿nancial development in
somehow generating growth and prosperity in the region.
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Figure 2: OLS Regression Lines, GDP Growth and Financial Development, Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil and Peru, 1980-2007. Sources: Penn World Table and Database on Financial Development
and Structure ￿les.
In terms of econometric modelling, since we have a T > N data set, the empirical
strategy is based on the relatively novel panel time-series analysis. Firstly, although
most of the variables used are stationary by de￿nition, or bounded within closed inter-
8vals, for non-stationarity in the country time-series we use the Im, Pesaran and Shin
(IPS (2003)) test, which allows for heterogeneous parameters and serial correlation.
The IPS test consists of an augmented Dickey-Fuller regression for each variable of
each country, and these are then subsequently averaged. The moments of the mean
and variance of the average ￿ t are -1.43 and .62 respectively6 7.
Secondly, the issue of heterogeneity bias in dynamic T > N panels, which is
caused because under wrongly assumed homogeneity of the slopes, the disturbance
term is serially correlated and the explanatory variables xs end up not being inde-
pendent of the lagged dependent variable yt-1. This is dealt with by the one-way
Fixed E⁄ects (FE) estimator which provides consistent estimates in dynamic models
when T ! 1, but it only considers heterogeneity of intercepts, and then by the
Swamy￿ s (1970) Random Coe¢ cients (RC) estimator, which assumes heterogeneity
of intercepts and slopes8.
All in all, although these countries shared similar poor macroeconomic charac-
teristics in the 1980s and 1990s, these estimators account not only for an important
econometric issue, but also for the fact that some of these countries do indeed present
di⁄erent levels of economic development (Brazil and Argentina are known to be rel-
atively more developed than Peru and Bolivia).
Furthermore, some would argue that there is economic and statistical endogeneity
6An alternative to IPS (2003) is the test by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002). However, this test assumes
parameter homogeneity, and therefore does not consider a possible heterogeneity bias present in the
data.
7Moreover, given that these countries shared some macroeconomic characteristics in the 1980s and
1990s, some would argue that there is between-country dependence present. However, the IPS test
assumes the existence of between-country independence. An alternative that considers the existence
of between-country dependence is proposed by Pesaran (2007), the cross-section IPS (CIPS) test.
However, CIPS assumes that N > 10 and we have N = 4 in our data set. It is therefore thought that
the IPS test in this case is slightly biased, but still informative and the best alternative available.
8The Mean Group estimator, proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995), is also an alternative.
However, this estimator is sensitive to outliers, a problem not faced by the RC estimator. In
addition, GMM-type estimators are not an alternative under T > N for the over￿tting problem.
See Bond (2002).
9present (i.e., ￿nance not being totally exogenous in determining growth). For exam-
ple, Robinson (1952), and Lucas (1988) cast doubt that ￿nance leads growth, and
suggest that when growth leads, ￿nance actually follows. Hence, we use instrumen-
tal variables estimation (i.e., the Fixed-e⁄ects with Instrumental Variables (FE-IV)
estimator), with the in￿ ation rate as the identifying instrument for the measures
of ￿nancial development being estimated9. The estimates provided by the FE-IV
estimator are asymptotically consistent and e¢ cient as T ! 110.
We therefore estimate static and dynamic models with di⁄erent pooled estimators
(i.e. the benchmark Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS), FE, RC and FE-IV), so
that di⁄erent econometric and economic issues are dealt with, and more reliable and
informative estimates provided. The basic estimated dynamic equation is as follows
GROWit = ￿i + ￿FINDEVit + ￿DEVit + ￿INVit + ￿OPENit (1)
+"GOVit + ￿POLit + ￿GROWit￿1 + ￿it;
in which GROW are the growth rates of the GDPs, FINDEV is the proxy for ￿nancial
development, which consists of the unobserved common factors of M2, private bank
credit over bank deposits, deposit money bank claims over deposit money bank and
central bank claims, and stock market capitalisation over GDP, DEV is the interaction
between education and urbanisation, INV is the share of investment to GDP, OPEN
is a measure of economic openness, GOV is the share of government to GDP, and
POL is a proxy for political regime characteristics.
In terms of results, ￿rstly we report the IPS statistics￿ GROW is -3.66, M2 is
9For instance, Azariadis and Smith (1996), Huybens and Smith (1999), Boyd, Levine and Smith
(2001) and Bittencourt (2008) suggest that ￿nancial development is, in fact, determined by in￿ ation.
10For a more thorough discussion about panel time-series analysis in general, see Smith and Fuertes
(2008) or Lee, Pesaran and Smith (1998).
10-2.32, DEV is -2.56, INV is -2.43, OPEN is -2.22, GOV is -2.17 and POL is -2.69￿
and they all suggest that we can reject the null hypothesis of unit roots and accept
in favour of the alternative that at least one variable of each country is, in fact,
stationary. This indicates that further data transformations are not needed, and also
justi￿es why panel-cointegration analysis is not pursued in this case.
Secondly, in Table Two￿ columns one, two, three and four￿ we report the sta-
tic and dynamic baseline estimates of M2 on growth using the POLS, FE and RC
estimators respectively. Apart from the POLS M2 estimates, which are positive
and signi￿cant against growth, the other M2 estimates are, in fact, not statistically
signi￿cant, and even present the wrong sign. The two control variables presenting
reasonable estimates are INV and GOV, with respectively positive and negative signs,
which con￿rm that higher investment rates contribute to economic growth and that
bigger governments tend to be detrimental to growth. Finally, the F* and Likeli-
hood Ratio (LR) tests indicate that there is some evidence of country ￿xed e⁄ects
and heterogeneity of intercepts and slopes, which justi￿es the use of the FE and RC
estimators in this instance.
More importantly, after estimating the regression-based Hausman test and re-
jecting the null of exogeneity, we can then make use of the FE-IV estimator. We
report the M2 estimates in Table Two￿ columns ￿ve and six￿ and in this case, M2
presents clear positive and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects on growth, which con￿rms
early evidence about the role of the liquid liabilities in promoting economic activ-
ity and consequently economic growth. Moreover, these results are also signi￿cant
because, ￿rstly we take into account a possible economic endogeneity problem, and
secondly the Hausman test indicates that there is indeed statistical endogeneity, and
therefore the use of the FE-IV estimator, with in￿ ation as the identifying instrument,
is well justi￿ed in this case. Essentially, M2, or the size of the ￿nancial sector, only
11becomes signi￿cantly positive against growth once we extract the variation in M2
that is not correlated with the residual.
The controls INV and GOV continue to present their expected signs, positive and
negative respectively, and the estimates are statistically signi￿cant. Furthermore, in
the ￿rst-stage regressions (available upon request) the identifying instrument, INFL,
presents negative and signi￿cant e⁄ects on M2, which ￿rstly rules out the possibility of
a weak instrument, and secondly highlights that the poor macroeconomic performance
of the 1980s and early 1990s had not only a detrimental e⁄ect to ￿nancial development,
but also serious indirect e⁄ects on growth.
12Table 2: POLS, FE, RC and FE-IV Estimates of Finance on Economic Growth, 1980-2007.
Static and Dynamic Models
GROW POLS (1) FE (2) FE (3) RC (4) FE-IV (5) FE-IV (6)
M2 1.37 (1.71) -.252 (-.21) -.428 (-.35) -.691 (-.46) 16.15 (2.18) 13.79 (2.04)
DEV -.000 (-.01) .013 (.86) .011 (.75) .019 (.66) -.023 (-.77) -.019 (-.72)
INV .285 (2.26) .463 (2.79) .296 (1.65) .515 (1.08) .590 (2.10) .475 (1.65)
OPEN .014 (.35) -.023 (-.18) -.026 (-.21) -.175 (-.65) -.631 (-1.85) -.545 (-1.77)
GOV -.225 (-1.37) -.370 (-1.82) -.375 (-1.83) -.734 (-2.83) -.998 (-2.30) -.864 (-2.24)
POL -.604 (-1.50) -.494 (-1.20) -.445 (-1.08) -.736 (-1.03) -1.08 (-1.49) -.888 (-1.33)
GROW￿1 .222 (2.22) -.031 (-.24) .167 (1.07)
F test 3.89 5.52 5.58
F* test 2.97 1.94 1.80 1.50
R2 .18 .08 .13
LR test 18.92
Hausman -4.37 -3.56
Wald test 42.86 17.96 22.10
T-ratios in parentheses. Number of observations: NT = 112. The basic estimated equation
is GROWit = ￿i + ￿M2it + ￿DEVit + ￿INVit + ￿OPENit + "GOVit + ￿POLit +
￿GROWit￿1 + ￿it, in which GROW is the growth rates of the real GDPs, M2 is the proxy for
￿nancial development, DEV is the interaction between education and urbanisation, INV is the share
of investment to GDP, OPEN is a measure of economic openness, GOV is the share of government
to GDP, and POL is a proxy for political regime characteristics. The identifying instrument is INFL.
POLS is the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares, FE is the Fixed E⁄ects, RC the Random Coe¢ cients
and FE-IV the Fixed E⁄ects with Instrumental Variables estimators.
13Thirdly, in Table Three￿ columns one, two, three and four￿ we report the static
and dynamic estimates of FINDEV on GROW using the POLS, FE and RC esti-
mators. The FINDEV estimates are not statistically signi￿cant in this case either.
Just as before, the control variables presenting reasonable estimates are INV and
GOV, with respectively positive and negative signs, which suggest again that higher
investment causes growth and that bigger governments are, in fact, detrimental to
economic activity. There is also evidence of heterogeneity of intercepts and slopes,
which justi￿es the use of the RC estimator in the dynamic instance.
In addition, after estimating the Hausman test and rejecting the null of exo-
geneity, we are then able to make use of the FE-IV estimator. The FINDEV proxy
presents clear positive and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects on growth, which highlights
the role that ￿nancial development in general can have in generating economic growth
in the region. Just as before, this is also important because ￿nancial development
only becomes signi￿cant once we account for economic and statistical endogeneity,
and therefore extract the variation in FINDEV that is not correlated with the resid-
ual.
The controls INV and GOV continue to present their expected signs, positive and
negative respectively, however these estimates are not entirely statistically signi￿cant
this time. Furthermore, in the ￿rst-stage regressions (which are available on request)
INFL presents negative and signi￿cant e⁄ects on FINDEV, and this not only rules
out the possibility of a weak instrument, but also highlights again the detrimental
e⁄ect of high in￿ ation to ￿nancial development and consequently to growth.
14Table 3: POLS, FE, RC and FE-IV Estimates of Finance on Economic Growth, 1980-2007.
Static and Dynamic Models
GROW POLS (1) FE (2) FE (3) RC (4) FE-IV (5) FE-IV (6)
FINDEV .013 (.04) -.068 (-.13) .013 (.03) -1.16 (-1.28) 5.00 (2.24) 3.02 (2.05)
DEV -.002 (-.86) -.012 (-.67) -.014 (-.82) -.009 (-.22) -.077 (-1.96) -.052 (-1.88)
INV .270 (1.96) .255 (1.40) -.000 (-.00) .385 (.86) .504 (1.69) .125 (.53)
OPEN .001 (.04) .087 (.65) .022 (.18) .080 (.23) -.074 (-.34) -.078 (-.48)
GOV -.379 (-2.09) -.493 (-2.30) -.570 (-2.86) -.872 (-.90) -.437 (-1.33) -.543 (-2.18)
POL -.765 (-1.18) -.594 (-.88) -.606 (-.97) -2.56 (-.80) -.580 (-.56) -.599 (-.76)
GROW￿1 .380 (3.53) -.000 (-.00) .412 (3.04)
F test 3.19 2.67 4.46
F* test .48 .20 1.67 1.47
R2 .21 .10 .15
LR test 59.49
Hausman -3.91 -2.57
Wald test 25.14 19.42 37.47
T-ratios in parentheses. Number of observations: NT = 112. The basic estimated equation
is GROWit = ￿i+￿FINDEVit+￿DEVit+￿INVit+￿OPENit+"GOVit+￿POLit+
￿GROWit￿1+￿it, in which GROW is the growth rates of the real GDPs, FINDEV is the proxy for
￿nancial development, DEV is the interaction between education and urbanisation, INV is the share
of investment to GDP, OPEN is a measure of economic openness, GOV is the share of government
to GDP, and POL is a proxy for political regime characteristics. The identifying instrument is INFL.
POLS is the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares, FE is the Fixed E⁄ects, RC the Random Coe¢ cients
and FE-IV the Fixed E⁄ects with Instrumental Variables estimators.
15Essentially, the estimates reported above indicate that ￿nancial development
played an important role in generating economic growth in a region which was plagued
by macroeconomic mismanagement and hyperin￿ ation during their political transi-
tions in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the positive e⁄ect of ￿nance on growth only
surfaces once we take into account the economic and statistical endogeneity seen be-
tween ￿nance, growth and the very macroeconomic instability seen at the time (i.e.,
in￿ ation is con￿rmed as the main driving macroeconomic force behind ￿nance, which
in turn a⁄ects economic growth).
Ultimately, what is stressed here is not only the importance of extra ￿nancial
resources in ￿nancing productive activities, even in societies displaying severe macro-
economic conditions, but also the need for macroeconomic stability in terms of low
in￿ ation rates. Certainly the e⁄ect of ￿nancial development in promoting growth
would be larger without the hyperin￿ ationary episodes seen in those countries in the
1980s and early 1990s, which contributed to reduce not only the size, but also the
activity of ￿nancial intermediaries in allocating credit to potential entrepreneurs, and
therefore in generating growth and prosperity in the region.
Concluding Observations
We investigated in this paper the role of ￿nancial development, or more wide-
spread access to ￿nance, in promoting economic growth in a panel of Latin American
countries which experienced severe macroeconomic conditions in the 1980s and 1990s,
and also political transitions in the early 1980s. The results, based on panel time-series
analysis, suggest that, once we take into account the role of macroeconomic instabil-
ity, ￿nancial development played a signi￿cant role in generating economic growth in
the region, or alternatively speaking, Schumpeter is right after all. However, it must
16be pointed out that the positive e⁄ects of ￿nancial development on growth could
be even larger had those countries not allowed those hyperin￿ ationary episodes to
happen in the ￿rst place. However, those countries simply did not have the right
institutional framework in place at the time.
The quality of the evidence presented is, to a certain extent, boosted not only
because we carry out a case study on those Latin American countries which expe-
rienced poor macroeconomic performance and political transitions, but also because
we use principal component analysis in an attempt to deal with model uncertainty
in growth regressions. Furthermore, we avoid the averages and take advantage of the
novel panel time-series analysis, so that we are able to deal with particular economic
and statistical issues not covered by the previous studies, which can be interpreted
as a step forward in terms of achieving better and more informative estimates on the
subject.
Moreover, the importance of carrying out a historical study on the subject of
￿nancial development and growth is mainly because, no doubt, developing countries
can indeed bene￿t from ￿nance, however ￿nance needs the right framework to thrive
(i.e., macroeconomic stability and all the economic institutions that generate stability,
such as central bank independence and sound ￿scal authorities, must be in place as
necessary conditions for development)11. Furthermore, it can be speculated that
the ￿nancial liberalisation taking place in some of those countries in the 1990s, or
the introduction of more competition in the ￿nancial sector, might have played a
positive role in widening access to ￿nance after the stabilisations of the 1990s. All
in all, the institutional reforms that those countries implemented in the 1990s (with
11For instance, Singh (2006), Singh and Cerisola (2006) and Santiso (2006) highlight the impor-
tance of the much improved macroeconomic performance in Latin America recently in producing
better economic outcomes from the 1990s onwards. Nevertheless, Carstens and JÆcome (2005) warn
that Brazil still has one of the least independent central banks in Latin America, which is always a
cause for concern.
17the implementation of in￿ ation targeting and ￿scal responsibility laws, and more
competition) seem to have paid some dividends in terms of ￿nancial development
and sustained economic growth after all.
About future work, the role of the ￿nancial liberalisation that took place in Ar-
gentina and Brazil in actually widening the access to ￿nance is something that can be
investigated. In addition, a comparison between these four Latin American countries
with the four Asian Tigers, which presented macroeconomic stability combined with
￿nancial development and sustained economic growth, would certainly enrich this
sort of analysis further.
To conclude, ￿nancial development played the role that Schumpeter predicted
in promoting growth in Latin America, even under severe political and economic
conditions. Nevertheless, these positive e⁄ects could have been even more signi￿cant
had these countries implemented particular economic institutions, like central bank
independence and ￿scal responsibility laws, at the time of their political transitions
in the 1980s12. All in all, ￿nancial development matters, so does macroeconomic
stability as a necessary condition for ￿nance and therefore growth and prosperity.
REFERENCES
Azariadis, C. and B. D. Smith. 1996. Private Information, Money, and Growth: Inde-
terminacy, Fluctuations, and the Mundell-Tobin E⁄ect. Journal of Economic Growth
1: 309-332.
Beck, T., and R. Levine. 2004. Stock markets, banks and growth: panel evidence.
Journal of Banking and Finance 28:423-442.
12Bittencourt (2010) suggests that, because of the distributional con￿ ict, and some populist ten-
dencies, some Latin American countries that transitioned from dictatorship to democracy in the
1980s su⁄ered from severe macroeconomic instability during their transitional periods.
18Beck, T., A. Demirguc-Kunt, and R. Levine. 2007. Finance, inequality, and the poor.
Journal of Economic Growth 12 (1).
Beck, T., R. Levine, and N. Loyaza. 2000. Finance and the sources of growth. Journal
of Financial Economics 58:261-300.
Bittencourt, Manoel. 2008. In￿ ation and ￿nancial development: evidence from Brazil.
In UNU-WIDER working papers RP 2008/14.
Bittencourt, Manoel. 2010. Financial development and inequality: Brazil 1985-1994.
Economic Change and Restructuring 43 (2).
Bittencourt, Manoel. 2010. Democracy, Populism and Hyperin￿ ation[s]: Some Ev-
idence from Latin America. In Working Papers 169, Economic Research Southern
Africa, University of Cape Town.
Bond, Stephen R. 2002. Dynamic Panel Data Models: A Guide to Micro Data Meth-
ods and Practice. Portuguese Economic Journal 1 (2):141-62.
Boyd, J., R. Levine, et al. 2001. The Impact of In￿ ation on Financial Sector Perfor-
mance. Journal of Monetary Economics 47: 221-248.
Bruno, Michael, and William Easterly. 1998. In￿ ation crises and long-run growth.
Journal of Monetary Economics 41:3-26.
Carstens, A. and L. JÆcome. 2005. Latin American Central Bank Reform: Progress
and Challenges. In IMF Working Paper.
Demirguc-Kunt, A., and R. Levine. 2001. Financial structure and economic growth.
Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: MIT Press.
19Fischer, Stanley. 1993. The role of macroeconomic factors in growth. Journal of Mon-
etary Economics 32:485-512.
Huang, Yongfu. 2005. What determines ￿nancial development? In Bristol Economics
Discussion Papers 05/580.
Huybens, E. and B. D. Smith. 1999. In￿ ation, Financial Markets and Long-Run Real
Activity. Journal of Monetary Economics 43: 283-315.
Im, Kyung So, M. Hashem Pesaran, and Yongcheol Shin. 2003. Testing for Unit Roots
in Heterogeneous Panels. Journal of Econometrics 115 (1):53-74.
King, Robert, and Ross Levine. 1993. Finance and Growth: Schumpeter might be
right. Quarterly Journal of Economics August.
Kuznets, Simon. 1955. Economic growth and income inequality. American Economic
Review 45 (1).
Lee, Kevin, H. Pesaran, and R.P. Smith. 1998. Growth empirics: a panel data ap-
proach - a comment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 113:319-323.
Levin, Andrew, Chien-Fu Lin, and Chia-Shang James Chu. 2002. Unit Root Tests in
Panel Data: Asymptotic and Finite-Sample Properties. Journal of Econometrics 108
(1):1-24.
Levine, Ross. 2005. Finance and growth: theory and evidence. In Handbook of Eco-
nomic Growth, edited by P. Aghion and S. Durlauf. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Levine, R., and S. Zervos. 1998. Stock markets, banks, and economic growth. Amer-
ican Economic Review 88:537-558.
20Lucas, R. 1988. On the mechanics of economic development. Journal of Monetary
Economics 22:3-42.
Pesaran, M. Hashem. 2007. A Simple Panel Unit Root Test in the Presence of Cross
Section Dependence. Journal of Applied Econometrics 27.
Pesaran, M. Hashem, and Ron Smith. 1995. Estimating Long-Run Relationships from
Dynamic Heterogeneous Panels. Journal of Econometrics 68 (1):79-113.
Robinson, J. 1952. The generalisation of the general theory. In The Rate of Interest
and Other Essays. London: MacMillan.
Rousseau, P. L., and P. Wachtel. 2000. Equity markets and growth: cross-country ev-
idence on timing and outcomes, 1980-1995. Journal of Banking and Finance 24:1933-
1957.
Santiso, Javier. 2006. Latin America￿ s Political Economy of the Possible. Cambridge,
MA, The MIT Press.
Schumpeter, J. 1912. The theory of economic development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Singh, A. 2006. Macroeconomic Volatility: The Policy Lessons from Latin America.
In IMF Working Paper.
Singh, A., and M. Cerisola. 2006. Sustaining Latin America￿ s Resurgence: Some
Historical Perspectives. In IMF Working Paper.
Smith, Ron, and Ana-Maria Fuertes. 2008. Panel Time-Series. In London: Centre for
Microdata Methods and Practice. Institute for Fiscal Studies.
21Swamy, P.A.V.B. 1970. E¢ cient Inference in a Random Coe¢ cient Regression Model.
Econometrica 38 (2):311-323.
22